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THE TRIBAL FRANCHISE: AN EXPRESSION OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGNTY AND A POTENTIAL SOLUTION TO THE
PROBLEM OF MASS DISENROLLMENT
By Brent K. Mulvaney*
I.  

INTRODUCTION

The Supreme Court has recognized the inherent right of
tribal sovereignty, i.e. a diminished form of complete sovereignty
that consists of the right of internal self-government, since the 19th
century.1 This right entails a subset of other legally recognized
rights, one of which is the right to determine tribal membership.2
Recently, tribal attorneys and other scholars in Indian law have been
puzzling over the scope of this right in relation to the developing
trend of mass disenrollment.3 Although it is a disheartening fact that
those facing disenrollment may be deprived of their identities, their
communities, and their rights as tribal citizens, it is perhaps hubristic
to assume that these problems can—or should be—solved by
entreating either the federal judiciary or Congress to protect the
rights of the individual Indian over that of his or her tribe. Whether
tribes have—or ought to have—an absolute right to determine not
*

J.D. Candidate, 2019, Seattle University School of Law. I am of Native
Hawaiian ancestry, and I have several connections to other American
Indigenous communities. In my future legal career, I hope to work with Indian
tribes, but I am deeply committed to promoting social justice for all indigenous
communities. The opinions that I share in this article are entirely my own, but
they are also my honest reflections on the thoughts and feelings that people who
are both genuine and genuinely Native have shared with me. This article is not
meant to impugn actions that are actual expressions of tribal sovereignty or the
motives of those that truly wish to preserve the integrity of their communities. I
do not think that anyone wishes to be or represent themselves as unjust. But we
all need to learn how to treat each other with the respect that we all deserve as
humans and fellow members in the several overlapping communities that we are
a part of, especially when we find ourselves in positions of authority. Thanks to
everyone who supplied me with inspiration and support, but particularly the
Geary family and the talented editors at the American Indian Law Journal.
1
See United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886); Cherokee Nation
v. State of Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831).
2
E.g., Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 222–23 (1897); Red Bird v. United States,
203 U.S. 76, 77 (1906); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 n.18
(1978).
3
E.g., Gabriel S. Galanda & Ryan D. Dreveskracht, Curing the Tribal
Disenrollment Epidemic: In Search of a Remedy, 57 Ariz. L. Rev. 383 (2015).
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only the criteria for enrollment but also that for disenrollment is an
issue complicated by an overarching concern that the application of
any positive limit upon the sovereign rights of tribes will necessarily
strip away essential features of tribal self-government. Such a
stripping-away would then potentially expose or produce a
vulnerability of tribal sovereignty while enhancing and justifying
the expansion of federal controls over the internal operations of
tribes.
While it is true that we must be mindful of potential
encroachments by the federal government upon tribal governance,
the ethical conflict surrounding mass disenrollment lies in the false
assertion that any acknowledgement of an absolute right to tribal
citizenship will lead to a diminishment of tribal sovereignty. Much
of the litigation surrounding mass disenrollment actions indicates
that those actions could not proceed without the depreciation of an
all-important aspect of tribal membership, the tribal franchise.4 The
right to vote, if recognized by a governing body, is not only a
primary feature of citizenship, it is the primary instrument of a fully
developed sense of tribal autonomy and an effective means for the
protection of due process rights. As such, this article will focus
primarily on why the preservation of the tribal franchise is a
necessary means to securing tribal citizenship that enhances, rather
than impugns, tribal sovereignty.
In Part II, this article will provide an analysis of the
development of legal notions concerning tribal identity. Rather than
recognizing the processes of self-identification utilized by tribes and
their members, the federal government sought to define Native
peoples and their societies in accordance with a Euro-centric
worldview. Consequently, sovereign tribes were deemed separate
from their “subservient members,” and because the roots of tribal
sovereignty rest in the combined will of the general membership of
a tribe, that sovereignty was obscured and potentially diminished.
When Native societies did not conform with colonial expectations,
those expectations were imposed upon the tribes through legislation.
Although the internal machinations of the tribes were disrupted by
this imposition, both the many tribes and the federal government
recognized a means by which the sovereignty of a tribe could be
expressed directly, the tribal franchise. Because of the manipulation
of tribal governments at the hands of Congress, tribal members are
4

See discussion infra Part III.B–E.
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now in a position where they must protect their sovereignty and
utilize it to preserve their rights as tribal citizens.
In Part III, this article will analyze whether disenrollment is
an expression of tribal sovereignty or a potential attack on its
foundation. The section will begin by critiquing arguments that have
been utilized to suggest that tribes have a sovereign right to disenroll
their members. The section will close with an analysis of how
disenrolling tribes have diminished the foundations of their
sovereign authority by explicitly disregarding the combined will of
tribal members for the purpose of extinguishing the rights of
potential disenrollees.
In Part IV, this paper will conclude by presenting an
argument as to why enhanced protection of the tribal franchise can
serve as a remedy for the disenrollment epidemic while promoting
tribal sovereignty. Because historical evidence of the distinction
between a tribe and its members—aside from that produced by the
federal government—is wholly lacking, it is important for tribal
attorneys and Indian law scholars to recognize tribal sovereignty as
the sovereignty of a tribe as a whole, i.e. a community of individual
Indians who exercise their sovereignty through the tribal franchise.
The only way to reclaim this more traditional notion of tribal
sovereignty is for tribal members to actively strive for the
unification of their combined will with that of the tribe through
active political participation. In order for such efforts to prove
successful, tribal members must not only fully exercise their voting
rights but also encourage the enactment of constitutional provisions
that will preserve those rights for future generations. If these efforts
are successful, the threat of unjust disenrollment will be
substantially abated if not completely neutralized.
II.  

THE DEVELOPMENT OF TRIBAL IDENTITY

There are few forces that have operated throughout the
course of human history that are as politically and culturally
disruptive as colonization. As a result, our notions concerning the
traditional political identities of American Indians have either been
distorted by a monocular and distinctly colonial perspective or were
never formed due to Euro-American ambivalence or disinterest.5
5

See Martha C. Knack, Women and Men, in A COMPANION TO THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 51, 61 (Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004).
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The anthropological record concerning traditional tribal political
structures does, however, indicate that early tribes were
organizational manifestations of kinship and, to a lesser extent, a
shared locus of activity.6 Further, the kinship bond exhibited in tribal
organizations is not bound by blood alone, for it may also be based
on adoption.7 In addition to notions of tribal identity based primarily
on kinship, early anthropological studies indicate that the identity of
a tribal community was necessarily intertwined with tribal
sovereignty, for the political actions of a tribe were generally
dictated by consensus.8
Moreover, the delegation of political authority within a tribe
was an inherently biological process; a tribal community would
adhere to the guidance of “situation-specific leaders” who had
demonstrated the skills required to address a persisting communal
need.9 As a result of European colonization, these once-fundamental
features of tribal politics were frustrated, obscured, and
paradoxically rejected for being in conflict with tribal selfdetermination. This process, which continues to influence the
American legal conception of tribal identity, has been furthered by
three major forces: (1) the federal government’s bilateral influence
on the study of indigenous communities, (3) the devaluation of
historical anthropological data, and (3) federal Indian policy that
altered the structure and identity of tribal organizations. These
externalities, rather than Native traditions, have encouraged tribal
governments to adopt policies establishing a pronounced
demarcation between community and sovereignty that can only be
overcome by the democratic process as envisaged in the tribal
franchise. It is this schism in tribal identity and the diminishment of
tribal voting rights that allow tribal governments to unilaterally
disenroll the members of a tribe.
While scholars in the field of anthropology have historically
pursued the goal of widespread intercultural competency,

6

See, e.g., Raymond J. DeMaille, Kinship: The Foundation for Native American
Society, in STUDYING NATIVE AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS 306, 331
(Russell Thornton Ed., 1998); Loretta Fowler, Politics, in A COMPANION TO THE
ANTHROPOLOGY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 69, 70 (Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004).
7
J. W. Powell, From Barbarism to Civilization, 1 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 98,
108 (1888).
8
Knack, supra note 5, at 61.
9
Id.
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ethnography was developed in order to promote colonial aims.10
Such developments are the products of what professor Les W. Field
refers to as “official anthropology”: the process of adapting
anthropological knowledge to the ontological demarcation of Native
identities for the purpose of shaping official government policies.11
It is this form of anthropology, having been employed by the federal
government, which serves as the foundation of extratribal legal
conceptions of both tribal and American Indian identities.
A.   The Lockean Influence on Concepts of American
Indian Identity
While not anthropological per se, the political theory of John
Locke can be seen as a prototype for later works in official
anthropology concerning American Indians. In writing his Second
Treatise of Government, Locke proceeded under the assumption that
there was once a “state of nature” that served as the bottom rung of
the socio-evolutionary ladder.12 After laying the foundation for this
concept, he then argues that this “state of nature” had its
contemporary counterpart in a generalized Native American
society.13 Aside from using this comparison to suggest the primitive
nature of American Indians, Locke introduced two ideas that would
profoundly influence early ethnographic studies and assimilationist
policies in America: He argued that the primitive nature of tribes
inhibited their abilities to develop into fully-functioning agrarian
societies,14 and he argued that—as primitive people—Native
Americans must have adopted the most primitive form of
commonwealth which he identified as monarchy.15 The first of these
assertions provided strong support for the soon to be popular notion
that the proper development of Native society required the paternal
10

Peter Whitely, Ethnography, in A COMPANION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF
AMERICAN INDIANS 435, 436 (Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004).
11
Les W. Field, Unacknowledged Tribes, Dangerous Knowledge: The
Muwekma Ohlone and How Indian Identities are “Known,” 18 WICAZO SA
REV. 79, 80 (2003).
12
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 8–14 (C. B. Macpherson
ed., Hackett Publ’g Co., Inc. 1980) (1690).
13
Id. at 29 (“[I]n the beginning all the world was America”).
14
See Id. at 25–30 (Arguing that Native Americans failed to utilize their land
and other natural resources in a way that would produce value for and sustain
their communities).
15
Id. at 55–56 (Providing a narrative account of how child-like primitive man
submitted to the rule of a common father).
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guidance of a more fully developed European nation. The second of
these assertions served to obscure the kinship bonds and communal
leadership that traditionally served as the basis for tribal
organizations.
Not only is Locke’s second-hand critique of Native
American society objectionable from an ethical stand-point, it is
objectionable in two major ways from an academic stand-point
because there is evidence that he selectively and intentionally
omitted sources that undermined his arguments from his work.16
First, while Locke’s assertions reflected the commonly held belief
that English technology was superior to that which could be found
in America at the time,17 they contradicted early accounts of English
settlers whose survival depended on the actions of Native peoples.
For example, Edward Winslow, an early settler of Plymouth Colony,
wrote a letter in 1621 that provides three points of contention with
Locke’s later work: Winslow recounted (1) how the plantation at
Plymouth adopted Native agricultural practices, (2) how settlers
experienced difficulties in adapting English farming methods to the
newfound environment, and (3) how Indians provided the settlement
with an abundance of oysters and venison.18 Such observations were
confirmed by William Wood in 1639, who again emphasized the
unparalleled generosity of the Natives of New England and the
extent to which those Indians instructed English settlers in the
planting and harvesting of Indian corn “by teaching [them] to cull
out the finest seede, to observe the fittest season, to deepe distance
for holes, and fit measure for hills, to worme it, and weede it; to
prune it, and dresse it as occasion shall require.”19 Rather than
indicating a lack of subsistence in Native communities, such
accounts indicate the reliance of early English settlers on the
generosity, communal nature, and traditional agricultural practices
of Native peoples.
16

See Morag Barbara Arneil, ‘All the World Was America’: John Locke and the
American Indian 52–70 (1992) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
College London) (on file with the University College London Library) (Arguing
that Locke omitted references to material in his possession when it would
weaken his arguments).
17
KAREN ORDAHL KUPPERMAN, SETTLING WITH THE INDIANS: THE MEETING OF
ENGLISH AND INDIAN CULTURES IN AMERICA, 1580–1640 81 (1980).
18
EDWARD WINSLOW & WILLIAM BRADFORD, MOURT’S RELATION OR JOURNAL
OF THE PLANTATION AT PLYMOUTH 131–37 (Henry Martin Dexter ed., John
Kimball Wiggin 1865) (1622).
19
WILLIAM D. WOOD, WOOD’S NEW-ENGLAND’S PROSPECT 77–79 (Boston,
John Wilson & Son 1865) (1639) (original spelling preserved).
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Furthermore, these observations provide grounds for
rejecting the supposition that Native societies were ever in need of
the paternal guidance of European nations. However, the prejudicial
assumptions underlying Locke’s work and colonial fervor continued
to shape a common European perception of Native peoples,
including that of Edward Winslow who, in spite of his sharing in an
abundance of Native resources, remarked on how the pristine—
unworked and uninhabited—condition of American riverbanks
would “grieve the hearts” of Englanders whose rivers were heavily
burdened by human habitation.20 As will become evident, this
tendency to confirm prejudicial assumptions is a common theme
throughout the development of American conceptions of tribal
identities.
Secondly, Locke’s understanding of the monarchical
structure of Native society, while perhaps in conformity with the
observations of the untrained settler, contradicted the observations
of one of the primary sources cited in his Second Treatise. In the
passage concerning the primacy of monarchical rule and its presence
in America, Locke makes a parenthetical reference to the empires of
Peru and Mexico.21 Because of his familiarity with the work of José
de Acosta, who documented the historical development of
indigenous societies in both Peru and Mexico, it has been suggested
that Locke’s socio-evolutionary theory, including the idea of the
primacy of the monarchical form of government, derives from
Acosta’s earlier work.22 While this seems likely, it is abundantly
clear that Locke was rather selective in choosing what material of
Acosta’s he would adopt as part of his own philosophy.
To illustrate this point and affirm an accurate conception of
traditional tribal societies in America, it will suffice to focus on two
of the many points of contention in the works of these scholars. First,
Acosta writes that the original societies in Peru were “comminalties
. . . governed by the advice and authoritie of many, which are as it
were Counsellors.”23 In the same text, Acosta indicates that the first
inhabitants of New Spain were likely arranged either in
20

WINSLOW & BRADFORD, supra note 18, at 137.
LOCKE, supra note 12, at 56.
22
William G. Batz, The Historical Anthropology of John Locke, 35 J. HIST.
IDEAS 663, 670 (1974).
23
2 JOSEPH DE ACOSTA, THE NATURAL & MORAL HISTORY OF THE INDIES 426
(Clements R. Markham ed., Edward Grimston trans., London, The Hakluyt
Society 1880) (1604) (original spelling preserved).
21

7

commonalties or were “barbarous, . . . without law, without King,
and without any certaine place of abode, [wandering] in troupes like
savage beasts.”24 As such, Acosta’s work indicates a far closer
relationship between indigenous communities and indigenous
sovereignty than that found within a monarchy, a form of rule in
which the reigns of power are perhaps furthest removed from the
general populous. Lastly, Acosta’s work comports with the modern
notion of a traditional tribal election process informed by communal
perception and initiated in response to a persisting communal need.
He writes, “[M]any nations of the Indies have not indured any Kings
or absolute soveraigne Lords, but live in comminalities, creating and
appointing Captains and Princes for certain occasions onely, to
whom they obey during the time of their charge, then after they
returne to their former estates.”25
Given the foregoing statements, why, then, did Locke claim
that monarchy was the first commonwealth both generally and in the
Americas? The answer is simple: Neither Acosta nor Locke
accepted commonalties and “barbarous societies” as genuine
commonwealths, i.e. political organizations serving the common
weal. In describing the societies he found in New Spain, Acosta
writes, “[In] the greatest part of [the] new world . . . there are no
settled kingdoms nor established commonweales, neither princes
nor succeeding kings.”26 Locke’s concurrence is evident from his
claiming that Native societies fail to properly cull value from their
land and, as a result, adequately provide for their communities.27
These attitudes once again demonstrate how externally applied
notions of Native identity were shaped by Eurocentrism, in this case
affirming the idea that a traditional notion of tribal sovereignty is
divorced from communal decision-making.
B.  

The Bureau of American Ethnology
And the Era of Assimilation

To fully understand how European prejudices shaped the
federal government’s understanding of American Indians and their
societies, one ought to first look to the formative years of the federal
agency concerned with the study and classification of Native
24

Id. at 427.
Id. at 410 (original spelling preserved).
26
Id. (original spelling preserved).
27
See LOCKE, supra note 12, at 25–30.
25
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peoples: the Smithsonian Institution’s Bureau of American
Ethnology (BAE). The BAE was created in 1879 by Congress with
the express purpose of shaping federal Indian policy.28
The formation of the BAE was prompted in part by John
Wesley Powell, the man who would later become the head of that
agency. In a report to the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary)
submitted in 1878, Powell argued that the federal government had
previously failed to convince Natives to accept early assimilationist
efforts on account of the dearth of ethnographic data available at the
time.29 In particular, Powell identified the primary obstacles to
assimilationist efforts as the inability of the federal government to
overcome and/or apprehend tribal organizations based on kinship
and communal ownership, including potential conflicts between
tribal customs and the idea of privately owned allotments and
inheritance, and the role of a chief as a speaker—rather than ruler—
of a pure democracy.30 According to Powell, ethnographic research
was required to address the “Indian problem” that resulted from the
cohabitation of “the white man and the Indian,” the solution to
which involved understanding the “primitive” facets of Native
society so that they might be overthrown in favor of modern societal
features that would facilitate social evolution.31 Powell’s statements
demonstrate the BAE’s conflicting intentions; the anthropological
concern for mapping genuine characteristics of tribal identity was
shackled to prejudicial notions concerning the inferiority of what
Powell identified as a dying, primitive Native way of life.32
This founding philosophy of the BAE was also influenced
by Powell’s colleague Lewis Morgan. Prior to the formation of the
BAE, Morgan—like Powell in his letter to the secretary—wrote on
the desirability of using ethnological data to support the “future
elevation” of Native peoples to the “position of citizens of the

28

George Pierre Castile, Federal Indian Policy and Anthropology, in A
COMPANION TO THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF AMERICAN INDIANS 268, 271–72
(Thomas Biolsi ed., 2004).
29
J. W. POWELL, REPORT ON THE METHODS OF SURVEYING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN
15 (Washington, Government Printing Office 1878).
30
Id. at 15–16.
31
Id. at 15.
32
See id. (“[I]n a very few years it will be impossible to study our North
American Indians in their primitive condition except from recorded history.”)
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State”33 and on the decline of the “ethnic life of the Indian tribes.”34
However, the most influential concept advanced by Morgan was his
formulation of social evolution based a on a succession of “Ethnical
Periods” divided into three main categories—savagery, barbarism,
and civilization—each of which, save the last, were divided into
three subcategories—lower, middle, and upper.35 Morgan asserted
that tribal societies could generally be classified as lying between
upper savagery and lower barbarism with some exceptions,36
whereas even “remote ancestors of the Aryan nations” had
developed societal forms that could be deemed modern
civilizations.37 Of all the factors that affected “ethnical
advancement” none was more important than the succession of the
arts of subsistence; in Morgan’s view, “the whole question of human
supremacy on the earth” depended upon a progression from
rudimentary means of subsistence, to pastoralism, and then to field
agriculture.38 For these reasons, Morgan felt federal Indian policy
should be founded on a commitment to gradually assimilate Native
peoples into American society,39 a point which he communicated to
President Hayes directly, stating that “the Indian cannot civilize . . .
any more than our own remote ancestors[ could skip over] ethnical
periods.”40 In order to facilitate this transition, he advanced the
following program:
The next condition into which the Indian tribes
would naturally advance is the pastoral. . . . [T]he
government should help them by furnishing herds of
33

LEWIS H. MORGAN, LEAGUE OF THE HO-DÉ-NO-SAU-NEE OR IROQUOIS ix–x
(Herbert M. Lloyd ed., Dodd, Mead & Co. 1901) (1851).
34
LEWIS H. MORGAN, ANCIENT SOCIETY OR RESEARCHES IN THE LINES OF
HUMAN PROGRESS FROM SAVAGERY, THROUGH BARBARISM TO CIVILIZATION
viii (Henry Holt & Co. 1877).
35
Id. at 8–12.
36
Id. at 10–11.
37
See id. at 8.
38
See id. at 19–27.
39
See Letter from Lewis H. Morgan to President Rutherford B. Hayes (July 31,
1877), in BERNARD J. STERN, LEWIS HENRY MORGAN: SOCIAL EVOLUTIONIST
55 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1931) (“[Indians] are neither devoid of intelligence
nor incapable of appreciating the usual incentives of human action. It will be
found possible to stimulate their industry and to lead them gradually into the
practice of labor, and with it into an improved plan of life.”).
40
Letter from Lewis H. Morgan to President Rutherford B. Hayes (Aug. 6,
1877), in BERNARD J. STERN, LEWIS HENRY MORGAN: SOCIAL EVOLUTIONIST
58 (Russell & Russell 1967) (1931).
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cattle and by sending herdsmen to care for them until
they can be made to see that the natural increase will
afford them an abundant meat and milk subsistence.
. . . In time they will raise cattle in millions . . . and
make a proper use of regions of no present use or
value to our people.41
From this, it can be seen that Morgan’s work—which would later be
advanced by the BAE—represented an earnest, albeit extremely
Eurocentric, attempt to align assimilationist policies with what he
felt was the true and present condition shared by Native
communities.
While the assimilationist movement—whose aims were
most fully recognized in the Dawes Act42—adopted portions of the
foundational theories advanced by Powell and Morgan, there is little
evidence that their actual policy concerns were accepted by the
federal government. Judging by the history of American Indian
assimilation, Professor Lee Baker’s observation that the field of
American anthropology “gained power and prestige because
ethnologists articulated theory and research that resonated with the
dominant discourse on race” was not only a truism but also a
positive limitation on the valuation of the BAE’s work as it
pertained to federal Indian policy.43 In accordance with this theory,
the federal government established policies aimed at excising the
most “anti-progressive” features of tribal identity in order to
accelerate a process of acculturation aimed at “civilizing” Native
peoples as rapidly as possible, a process wholly divorced from any
anthropological concern for truly understanding, preserving, or
accounting for the genuine status or gradual development of Native
societies.44
Clearly, Secretary Henry M. Teller employed some degree
of ethnographic understanding when he prompted the establishment
of Courts of Indian Offenses and the promulgation of the Code of

41

Id.
See discussion infra at 10–14.
43
LEE D. BAKER, FROM SAVAGE TO NEGRO: ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF RACE, 1896-1954 27 (Univ. of Cal. Press, Ltd. 1998) (1966).
44
See FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY IN THE FORMATIVE
YEARS: THE INDIAN TRADE AND INTERCOURSE ACTS, 1780–1834 156–57
(1962).
42
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Indian Offenses in 1883.45 In his letter to then Commissioner of
Indian Affairs Hiram Price, Teller identified several practices of
Native peoples which taken together would prove to be a “great
hindrance to the civilization of the Indians”: (1) particular feasts and
dances, (2) plural marriage, (3) all practices of medicine men, and
(4) burial rites involving the destruction of the property of the
deceased.46 Given Teller’s concerns, Price then established the Code
of Indian Offenses, outlawing these practices.47 He also created
several Courts of Indian Offenses at various reservations in which a
tribunal of three Indians would be appointed by an Indian agent to
judicially enforce the code.48 As such, these acts of the federal
government not only mandated the policing of Native identity but
also delegated that task to a small subset of a tribe’s membership,
who—in fulfilling their mandate under the direction of an Indian
agent—would likely starve or imprison so-called Indian offenders
until they could demonstrate that they no longer adhered to oncesacred aspects of their cultural identity.49 Further, the Act served as
an endorsement of the federal government’s paternal role in
determining how tribal identity would be defined in the future.
After thoroughly disrupting Native religious practices and
forcing tribes to adopt a system of centralized adjudicative authority,
Congress furthered its policy of forced assimilation by passing the
Dawes Act of 1887, also known as the General Allotment Act
(GAA).50 The GAA is typically recognized as an act requiring the
apportionment of tribally owned lands so that they might be allotted
to tribal members on a roughly per capita basis modified in
accordance with an allottee’s familial status.51 Additionally, those
individual allotments would— upon creation—be held in trust on
the behalf of each allottee by the federal government, rendering
45

See U.S. OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIRS, REGULATIONS OF THE INDIAN
DEPARTMENT, WITH AN APPENDIX CONTAINING THE FORMS USED 86–88
(Washington, Gov’t Printing Office 1884).
46
Id.
47
Id. at 88–91.
48
Id. at 88.
49
Generally, cultural offenses were punishable by imprisonment while
subsequent offenses were punishable by a denial of rations. Additionally, those
engaged in the practices of medicine men could be imprisoned until they could
prove that they would forever abandon those practices, whereas those practicing
polygamy or failing to adequately provide for their families could be denied
rations for as long as the offense continued. Id. at 88–91.
50
24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified in part at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331–81).
51
Id.
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those lands inalienable but also unburdened by taxation, for a period
of twenty-five years.52 However, lands that remained under tribal
ownership after those allotments were made became “surplus” land,
the sale of which was opened to the public.53
The GAA was eventually amended by the Burke Act in
54
1906. That Act authorized the Secretary to issue fee patents for an
allotment during a trust term after determining its possessor to be
sufficiently “competent.”55 Soon after, several competency
commissions were established to more rapidly convert allotted lands
held in trust to lands held in fee so as to open them up for sale to
non-Indians.56 The initial effects of these enactments were the
diminishment of the tribal land base and the privatization of land
ownership in Indian country. However, the proclaimed intended
result of this push for diminishment and privatization was to force
individual Indians to engage in agriculture by severely restricting
their ability to engage in other more traditional subsistence
practices.57
These enactments and the policies that they embody both
converged with and diverged from the course of assimilation and
related policy concerns put forward by Powell and Morgan. While
Powell encouraged a level of understanding that is not in any way
reflected in the GAA, he identified aspects of Native society that
were counterintuitive to and, therefore, must be overthrown in order
to achieve civilization.58 In particular, Powell viewed the concept of
communal ownership and inheritance as a social concept that was
detrimental to the goal of assimilation.59 It is in regard to this topic
that Powell provides an illustration of one potential path to
civilization:
Among [certain tribes,] much property has been
accumulated, and with the increase of their wealth
52
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the question of inheritance and individual ownership
has at last spontaneously sprung up, and . . . these
tribes are intensely agitated on the subject; the parties
holding radical sentiments are rapidly increasing,
and it is probable that soon . . . the customs of
civilization in this respect will be adopted.60
The above passage could be understood as indicating an
institutional conflict between a present state—defined in part by the
presence and accumulation of wealth—and past customs that (from
Powell’s perspective) were outmoded. According to Powell, social
evolution is the direct result of this form of competition.61 In a way,
the GAA can be viewed as an assimilationist attempt to agitate the
traditional modes of subsistence and ownership in tribal
communities.62 While such a view would align with the foregoing
theory, it would be wholly incompatible with Powell’s preference
for the gradual and organic progress of Native societies, for
according to Powell, “[W]e must either deal with the Indian as he is,
looking to the slow but irresistible influence of civilization with
which he is in contact to affect a change, or we must reduce him to
abject slavery.”63 Given Powell’s dichotomy, he would likely have
found the forceful means and the ideologically and culturally
subversive aim of the GAA, when combined, to be tantamount to
slavery. This conflict between Powell’s work and the GAA shows
that, regardless of the anthropologist’s genuine concern for Native
cultural identity, the federal government was only willing to adopt
and distort ethnographic data and theories advanced by the BAE
insofar as they reinforced the notions of Native inferiority that
undergirded federal Indian policy or suggested an expedient route to
assimilation.
A letter sent by Morgan to President Lincoln in 1862 is
indicative of not only the conflict between what would later become
BAE and federal Indian policy but also the connection between this
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forced transition to agriculture and slavery.64 In the letter, Morgan
indicates that the management of Indian affairs by the federal
government had enabled its agents to defraud Native peoples
through the misappropriation of Indian annuities through collusions
with licensed traders.65 Morgan writes that, in addition to these
annuities, annual appropriations intended to fund the development
and operation of agricultural farms were released to Indian agents.66
Morgan then describes how $20,000 of these funds were being
utilized on the Yankton Reservation: “The agent . . . was working
50 Indians on [a] farm of a thousand or more acres at 50 cents each,
per day, and intended to increase the number to 100. . . . [T]he men
were paid in goods [from] the licensed trader.”67 This account of
how money was managed in Indian country leaves little room for
doubting that the federal government—knowingly, willingly, or
ignorantly—enabled the malfeasance of Indian agents and the
licensed traders with whom they were associated. As a solution to
this ongoing problem, Morgan encouraged the establishment of
Indian states where tribes could raise cattle and engage in trade on a
national level.68
In addition to providing a substantial means of subsistence
for the tribes, such a solution would have enabled direct
participation by individual Indians in the establishment and
development of strong tribal economies. By encouraging the
adoption of such a policy, Morgan acknowledged the skill,
expertise, and inherent value of traditional Native horsemanship, the
practice of which was closely tied to the cultural identities of many
tribes, as well as the intellect and capacity for self-management of
Native peoples.69 Compare this to the policy behind the GAA, which
completely and utterly devalued Native traditions and tribal identity,
forced individual Indians to work for less than what was already
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owed to them by the federal government, and conflicted with both
traditional and then-emerging notions of tribal sovereignty.
Despite the fact that Morgan’s letter pre-dates the GAA by
two decades, the implementation of the GAA indicates that
Morgan’s criticisms continued to apply throughout the era of
assimilation. Although individual Indians were “granted” fee title to
their own allotments, these parcels of land were already held in
common by each member of a tribe under its traditional notions of
ownership. Therefore, the grant of fee title that is presumed to be the
incentivizing element of the GAA represented little more than a
grant of alienability, a right which could only be deemed valuable
from a capitalist perspective wholly foreign to most allottees and
their tribes. As the price for this “privilege” was a massive reduction
in tribal land-holdings,70 it is evident that Native peoples were once
again given far less than what they were already owed. While the
federal government, under the GAA, also pledged to provide Native
peoples with the requisite training and supplies to transition from
tribal to agrarian ways of life, individual Indians were rarely given
adequate financial support and were forced to live on allotments
where they would be geographically cut off from traditional,
familial, and communal support systems.71 In this way, the GAA
profoundly influenced the disintegration of several key aspects of
tribal identity and tribal self-governance. To make matters worse,
many Indians who resisted this program of subversion were
imprisoned.72 Collectively, these observations indicate that the
application of the GAA led to situations similar to those described
in Morgan’s letter to President Lincoln, situations in which the
federal government’s control of Native assets allowed for gross
manipulations of tribal societies and Indian labor. As this labor was
paid out of monies held in trust on behalf of the several tribes, it is
perhaps inappropriate to see this as genuine payment, rather the
motivating force behind Indian agricultural labor was the
withholding of these funds and other tribal assets in combination
with the threat of imprisonment. As such, Powell would be correct
70
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to assert that such a forceful program of assimilation was akin to
slavery.
While a great many legal scholars acknowledge the effects
of this forced transition to agriculture, there are far fewer writers on
Indian law who acknowledge how application of the GAA shaped
the legal understanding of tribal membership.73 In 1896, the federal
government established enrollment commissions to determine the
legitimacy of claims of tribal membership so as to determine
whether or not claimants were entitled to allotments under the
GAA.74 In order to meet their objective, these commissions were to
evaluate blood quantum, compel witnesses, and collect other
evidence to establish official rolls for the several tribes over the
course of six months.75 As a result of the lack of tribal involvement
and this time constraint, the commissions produced rolls, excluding
members and including non-members of tribes, that memorialized
their inability to properly evaluate tribal membership.76 In spite of
these errors, the authority of these official rolls, the importance of
blood quantum in determining tribal membership, and the unilateral
authority of Congress to determine tribal membership would be
continually reaffirmed by the courts.77 Although they clearly
conflict with traditional notions of tribal identity based on nonfamilial kinship and shared activity, these aspects of assimilationist
policy would be reaffirmed by the act intended to put an end to the
federal government’s program of assimilation, and they continue to
exist within both tribal and federal Indian law to this day.
The assimilationist aim as adopted by the BIA also led to the
restructuring and centralization of tribal governments. During the
implementation of the GAA, agents of the BIA “ignore[d] existing
legitimate Native governments in favor of new governments
organized on its initiative, because the latter were more amenable to
73
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Bureau desires.”78 In the 1920s, this policy led to the BIA creating
the Navajo Tribal Council in order to facilitate the leasing of tribal
lands for the sake of oil exploration and development by the federal
government; the current government of the Navajo Nation evolved
out of this act.79 The BIA also made similar unsuccessful attempts
to restructure/replace the All-Pueblo Council and the tribal council
on the Flathead Reservation.80 In each of these cases and others, the
BIA attempted to shift the political power of tribal organizations
from communities committed to traditional values to groups of
individuals who were willing to cooperate with the capitalist aims
of the federal government. While the policy behind this trend might
not have persisted, the transition into the next era of federal Indian
policy would occur at a time when the BIA was actively engaged in
disrupting, dismantling, and redefining the distribution of tribal
political power.
C.  

The Indian Reorganization Act

Much of the current legal interpretation concerning tribal
identity as it pertains to enrollment and tribal sovereignty results
from policy decisions related to and the enactment of the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).81 While one may be critical of a
portion of the effects of the IRA or its implementation, it is far more
difficult to find fault with its purpose. In proposing the bill to
Congress, John Collier, then Commissioner for the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, stated that the IRA was intended to grant Indian tribes the
“freedom to organize for the purposes of local self-government and
economic enterprise [so that they might achieve] civil liberty,
political responsibility, and economic independence.”82 The IRA
was also meant to address issues presented by the Meriam Report,83
which was a general study of the living conditions in Native
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communities.84 The report indicated that the totality of the living
conditions to be found in most of these communities was conducive
to the development of poor health and the spread of disease;85 also
noted in the report was the federal government’s complete and utter
failure to aid in the acclimation of Native peoples to the conditions
produced by allotment, establish and administer educational and
healthcare services, and provide Native peoples with adequate legal
protections.86 The means Collier identified to serve these ends were
the repeal of assimilationist policies—which was to be facilitated in
part by the federal government turning over control of various assets
and programs to the tribes they were meant to serve—and the
establishment and recognition of strong tribal governments with
written constitutions.87
In the years that followed the enactment of the IRA, Indians,
anthropologists, and policymakers would debate over what should
serve as the basis for the form of the soon-to-be-established tribal
governments. Loretta Fowler indicates that, after the development
of theories concerning the process of acculturation in the 1920s,
many anthropologists categorized Native representatives as being
either conservative (resistant to the idea of western government) or
progressive (open to the idea of political reorganization under the
BIA).88 Felix Cohen, an attorney who greatly influenced the
establishment of tribal constitutions, indicated that a similar debate
was taking place between anthropologists and BIA administrators
when he wrote the following:
The word anthropology is a red flag to the regular
Indian Service Administrator. To him, it generally
connotes a breed of people that look upon Indians as
museum exhibits to be measured and cataloged,
rather than as human beings faced with the universal
human problems of earning a living, keeping healthy,
raising a family, getting along with neighbors, and
enjoying life.89
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This stereotypified perspective disregards the profound and
deleterious effect that assimilationist policies had on Native peoples
and their living conditions. To take Native peoples as they were at
the time that the IRA was being drafted and implemented as the sole
focus of progressive policy reform, particularly from a non-Indian
perspective, would entail the dismissal of those traditional practices
and perspectives that were disrupted by the process of assimilation,
for while these aspects of Native culture could persist in the hearts,
minds, or souls of Native peoples, they were not allowed to persist
as a facet of Native activity. Even for Cohen, a progressive who
arguably evaded other stereotypes, the value of historical
anthropology was in its ability to aid in the implementation of
policies adopted by politicians.90
Although the IRA may have been aimed at establishing a
foundation upon which traditional notions of tribal sovereignty
could be asserted, the devaluation of historical anthropology
frustrated this purpose. Shortly after the IRA was enacted, Cohen
drafted an opinion issued by the Department of the Interior on the
behalf of Solicitor Nathan R. Margold concerning the “Powers of
Indian Tribes” (Opinion),91 which explained that tribal powers were
internally defined:
In point of form it is immaterial whether the powers
of an Indian tribe are expressed and exercised
through customs handed down by word of mouth or
through written constitutions and statutes. In either
case the laws of the Indian tribe owe their force to the
will of the members of the tribe.92
This language served as the basis for the subsequent assertion that
“an Indian tribe must, if it has any power at all, have the power to
prescribe the forms through which its will may be registered.”93
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However, as was to be expected, any particular powers described in
the opinion are illustrated by way of federal caselaw.94
This reliance on federal caselaw presented a distorted view
of what tribal sovereignty meant for many tribes. While pre-1920s
caselaw may have emphasized a tribe’s political authority,95 very
few, if any, judicial opinions of the era illustrated particular
manifestations of this authority or the route by which it is derived
from the will of tribal members. Furthermore, caselaw that
exemplified the exercise of tribal self-governance was wrought with
the anthropological shortcomings of the prior era.96 Even at its best,
such caselaw only represented those rights that were both asserted
by tribes sufficiently acquainted with American jurisprudence and
recognized as valid by the courts. As a result, the Opinion would
conclude with an espousal of inherent tribal powers that were overly
generalized and could—at least in part—be described as the
hallmarks European governmental forms.97 According to the
Opinion, these powers were “subject to modification,” not in light
of distinct traditions, but “with respect to particular tribes in the light
of particular powers granted, or particular restrictions imposed, by
special treaties or by special legislation.”98 These externally defined
powers would serve as the defining features of a fictional, shared
political identity of tribes that are—and have always been—
distinguished by unique and vibrant cultures and customs that were,
in this Opinion, largely disregarded.
94
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Roughly one month after Cohen drafted the Opinion, he
would write a memorandum “On the Drafting of Tribal
Constitutions” (Memorandum), which would “offer useful
suggestions to Indians engaged in drawing up constitutions for
adoption and approval under the [IRA] and to members of the Indian
Service who may be called upon to assist in this task.”99 This lengthy
document, which provided examples of previously drafted tribal
constitutional provisions that were idealized by Cohen, and a model
constitution drafted in-part by Cohen would serve as templates for
those tribes that had not committed the blueprint for their political
identities to writing.
One section of the Memorandum entitled “Offices and
Titles” was provided to help tribes and BIA employees decide
whether they would “choose between the older forms of tribal
government and the forms of government that are customary in
white communities.”100 While Cohen claimed that many of the
“ancient traditions of [tribal] self-government . . . [had] been
forgotten,” he did state that these traditions “offer[ed] a very
important source of knowledge and wisdom to those who are
engaged in drafting a constitution.”101 However, the inherent value
of these traditions was to be found in the fact that “each Indian tribe
had its own governing officers, its own policemen if policemen were
necessary, its own system of land holding and inheritance, its own
laws of marriage and divorce, and its own code of crimes.”102 In this
way, Cohen recognized the value of tradition only insofar as it
served the practical ends of the federal government as set forth in
the IRA and only insofar as it concerned aspects of government that
had European analogues. Even when these traditions could serve the
practical purpose of informing the organization of a tribal
government, Cohen cautioned that while “old methods” would
likely prove satisfactory “on those reservations which have never
been allotted, where the Indian community is strong, and where the
difficult problems of contacts between individual Indians and
individual white men seldom arise,” they could be “entirely
99
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inapplicable” in regions “where white men have entered in large
numbers and where most of the Indians’ troubles arise out of the
activities of whites”;103 as the BIA’s implementation of the IRA—
including the aid it provided in the tribal constitutional drafting
process—strongly suggests that the situation of many if not all tribes
fit the latter description, this could be seen as a thinly veiled
argument that tribes organizing under the IRA should adopt new
forms of government. The ideal form of government described by
Cohen in his Memorandum104 and his model constitution was a
representative democracy.105
In addition to describing the form of government to be
adopted by the tribes, Cohen also included exemplary provisions
concerning tribal membership in the Memorandum. These
provisions defined membership in terms of one’s inclusion on tribal
rolls (as prepared by the BIA), blood quantum, the status of one’s
parents, one’s residence, and tribal adoption practices.106 While
these examples were used suggestively, they were coupled with the
Secretary’s urging tribes to adopt regulations—including positive
limits on the automatic adoption of the children of genuine
members107—because “it was paramount to their tribal welfare to
weed out those Indians seeking membership who possessed a low
blood quantum.”108 Furthermore, the definition of “Indian” provided
in the IRA excluded those Indians possessing less than one-half
blood quantum that were not directly descended from members
enrolled in federally recognized tribes and living on a reservation on
June 1, 1934.109 Instead of defining tribal membership in terms of
inclusion based on kinship, Cohen and those at the BIA encouraged
tribes to define tribal membership in terms of exclusion based
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primarily on blood quanta and documentation prepared by nonIndians.
While it has been suggested by Elmer Rusco and others that
a model constitution was never provided to tribes organizing under
the IRA,110 David Wilkins subsequently found both the model
constitution drafted in-part by Cohen and evidence that it was
distributed to those BIA employees that would aid in the drafting of
tribal constitutions.111 Comparison of this model with those
constitutions drafted immediately after the enactment of the IRA
strongly indicates that BIA employees to whom this model was
distributed had a profound influence on the drafting process. Several
tribes drafting constitutions during the 1930s adopted most of the
boilerplate language of the model form with minimal deviations.112
To these more formulaic constitutions, many of the adopting tribes
added membership provisions (for the most part concerning blood
quanta) as suggested in the Memorandum,113 a section concerning
vacancies and removals from tribal offices,114 and a section
concerning land rights.115 To a lesser extent, some of these tribes
included a bill of rights possessed by tribal members.116 By and
large, these additional sections aimed at preserving those rights that
were threatened under the administration of the previous era share
110
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identical language,117 which suggests that these sections were either
drafted with or disseminated to the tribes by BIA employees.
Although some tribes had previously established their own
constitutions—many of which were found by Cohen to be in some
way exemplary118—all tribes drafting IRA constitutions were
required to have their drafts approved by the Secretary of the
Interior.119 Those constitutions that were approved indicated that a
tribe’s authority would continue to be restricted by a similar
approval requirement.120 For example, the Oglala Sioux of the Pine
Ridge Reservation adopted multiple constitutions prior to the
enactment of the IRA.121 In drafting the Tribe’s first constitution,
the Oglala Sioux outlined a form of tribal government that would
maintain their cultural heritage by encouraging broad strokes
political participation—through the Oglala Tribal Council, a large
body of delegates representing the eight districts of the
reservation—and preserving the role of an elected chief.122
117
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Following the adoption of this constitution, the Superintendent of
the Pine Ridge Reservation, Ernest W. Jermark—who complained
that the newly formed council failed to be of any material benefit to
him—encouraged the Tribe to adopt amendments that would both
greatly reduce the size of the tribal council and require written
approval from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs before any future
constitutional amendments could be made.123 This revised and
amended constitution was accepted by the Tribe in 1928.124
Between 1928 and 1935, the evolution of the Oglala Sioux
constitution is a microcosmic example of the transition from tribal
governments rooted in communal sovereignty to tribal
representative democracies managed by the Department of the
Interior. At the direction of Jermark, the Tribe elected its first
council under the 1928 constitution, which reduced the number
tribal representatives from eighty to twenty-one.125 Many were
displeased by this drastic change, and the reservations became
severely factionalized, which resulted in various forms of political
dissidence including the creation of an extralegal government.126 By
1933, the tribe had adopted a new constitution that settled the series
of conflicts that arose out of this political divide by doing away with
the commissioner approval requirement of the last constitution and
recognizing that each member of the Tribe had a right to vote;
however, this new constitution also established a tribal council that
had complete management authority regarding any business that
came before the Tribe.127 In 1934, after the enactment of the IRA,
the requirement for commissioner approval was replaced with
review requirements for three categories of tribal legislative action:
(1) no review was required for those actions that pertained only to
tribal operations or tribal official procedure; (2) certain actions,
including but not limited to the alteration of voting districts and
hiring legal counsel, required secretarial approval; and (3) decisions
related to tribal funding and property required approval by the
reservation superintendent.128
By encouraging tribes to formally adopt representative
democracies, the BIA diminished the authority of the general
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membership. Even though many tribal constitutions mirroring
Cohen’s model that were adopted by tribes under the IRA
recognized that the primary governing body was the General Tribal
Council (all members qualified to vote),129 IRA constitutions
formally recognized a process by which the totality of the authority
of a tribe—aside from the right to review and vote on official
decisions—would be vested in approximately five tribal officials.130
This authority once vested under an IRA constitution would then be
subject to limitations imposed by the Secretary or the superintendent
of a reservation, which, by extension, further restricted the authority
of the membership as a whole.131 By making such a constitution the
supreme law of the land on a particular reservation, a tribal drafters
represented, at least externally, that that the tribe as a whole acted
through its officials and not its members. In the context of
disenrollment, this representation is made internally as well, for
through the act of disenrollment, the identity of the tribe is wholly
conflated with that of its officials. This situation resulted not from
the federal government’s acceptance or recognition of tribal custom
or tradition but from a process beginning with discovery by which
Native cultures were scrutinized, criticized, and—to a certain
extent—diminished. While a tribe organized under the IRA may be
healthy and fully functioning, officials seeking to unjustly excise
tribal members may capitalize on the fact that they are clothed in the
protections inherent to the authority that tribal sovereignty confers
whereas potential disenrollees are not.
Given anthropological accounts concerning the connection
between kinship and tribal identity and tribal governance based on
consensus,132 the federal government’s imposition of representative
forms of government—under which major decisions would be
decided by quorums of enrolled voters, a separate and distinct
executive body, and the Secretary—drastically altered the
ideological foundations of those societies that had not made these
decisions on their own.133 However, Cohen did recognize that tribal
129
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officials were direct representatives of the combined will of tribal
members, even going so far as to quote a Fort Belknap elder in
saying that “[t]hey are merely the Voice or Interpreter of the wishes
of the people.”134 It is presumably for this reason that Cohen’s model
constitution recognized that the General Tribal Council was the
governing body of the tribe, but the model constitution only
described two powers that would clearly be directly exercised by
such a council: (1) the power to vote in the election of tribal officials
and (2) the right to call special meetings to review official
decisions.135 In addition to these powers, the IRA provides that
constitutional adoption and amendment requires a majority vote of
the General Tribal Council.136 While these powers are limited,
Cohen, in his model constitution, recognized that a General Tribal
Council could have further powers delegated to it by the members
of its tribe or the federal government and that the reserved, inherent
powers of a tribe—at least insofar as they were not previously
limited by acts of Congress—could be exercised by the General
Tribal Council through the adoption of bylaws and constitutional
amendments.137 While these powers—even when fully exercised—
are unlikely to lead to a complete unification of the will of tribal
members with the actions of its officials, they are perhaps the surest
means by which the members of a tribe may collectively exercise
their sovereign authority. As such, these powers, which could
potentially check the unjust actions of tribal officials, when utilized
effectively, may collectively be used as a tool to fight unjust
disenrollment.
III.   THE TRIBAL FRANCHISE AND DISENROLLMENT
Disenrollment—a term which has no meaning or equivalent
in any Native tongue,138 a term which had no special legal meaning
prior to the 1930s139—is the act by which the representatives of a
women as well as men.” Felix S. Cohen, Americanizing the White Man, in THE
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tribe may deny quintessential aspect of the identities of tribal
members: their connections with the lands of their ancestors, their
rights and benefits as recognized in treaties and other agreements
with the federal government, and their abilities to identify with the
whole of their shared tribal community.140 Regardless of any
potential merits behind such an action, the disenrollment of genuine
tribal members causes bilateral harm: By disenrolling such a
member, the representatives of a tribe erode—in a purely legal
sense—the genuine connections between that member and his or her
tribe, and in doing so, they fray the bonds between the tribe and its
past, present, and future members.141 At its best, disenrollment
serves to remedy errors on universally inaccurate tribal rolls
prepared by non-Indians142 concerned with invalidating or settling
en masse the claims of those Indians that their government had
disenfranchised.143 At its worst disenrollment is motivated by the
prospect of the economic gains that would result from thinning out
tribal membership when a tribe has instituted per capita distributions
of tribal revenues.144 To argue against these forms of disenrollment
is not to attack the tribal sovereignty that serves as the basis for these
actions, it is to argue on the behalf of the tribal membership that is
and has always been the source of sovereign authority, that is
collectively the tribe in itself, and whose sovereign rights and
internal cohesion is denied by the act of disenrollment.
A.   Tribal Sovereignty and Justifications for Disenrollment
Many eloquent proponents of disenrollment claim that it
may be justified as a traditional practice or right of Native peoples;
this claim is appealing but unfounded. Advocates for disenrollment
cite both Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez and the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP) as
authorities affirming such a right. However, neither of these
authorities explicitly approve the practice of disenrollment, and both
authorities rest on the assertion that “Indian tribes are ‘distinct,
140
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independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights’ in matters of local self-government.”145 As disenrollment
was not a traditional practice of Native peoples,146 in order for it to
be considered to be or result from a natural right of a tribe, it must
be approved collectively by its membership or else it will not be an
expression of its sovereignty.
1.  

Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez

Martinez centered around a controversy arising in
connection with a provision of the Santa Clara Pueblo constitution
stating that tribal membership would be denied to the children of a
mother of the Pueblo and a nonmember father.147 Because there was
no similar rule that would apply to the children of a Santa Claran
father, the respondent, Julia Martinez, originally brought an action
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of
this provision that would deny membership to her children.148 In
doing so, Martinez asserted that, under Title I of ICRA,149 the
ordinance violated her right to equal protection under the laws of the
tribe.150 The Court—after accepting that suit could be brought
against a Tribal officer151—rejected the notion that such a cause of
action was available to Martinez in federal court for three reasons:
(1) while ICRA was enacted to preserve the rights of tribal members
against the overreach of tribal governments, the legislative history
of the Act shows that it was intended to promote “the policy of
furthering Indian self-government”;152 (2) a writ of habeas corpus is
the only form of relief available under ICRA;153 and (3) only
Congress, rather than the federal judiciary, has the authority to
review tribal legislation.154
Invoking Martinez to justify disenrollment actions is
problematic for several reasons. Facially, the controversy in
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Martinez and disenrollment challenges are clearly non-analogous.
Further, to apply the argument supporting the Court’s decision in
Martinez in the context of disenrollment would lead to logical
inconsistency. The fundamental basis of the Martinez opinion was
expressed by the lower court as follows:
If [tribal sovereignty has] any meaning at all, [it]
must mean that a tribe can make and enforce its
decisions without regard to whether an external
authority considers those decision wise. To abrogate
tribal decisions, particularly in the delicate area of
membership, for whatever ‘good’ reasons, is to
destroy cultural identity under the guise of saving it.
Congress has not indicated that it intended [ICRA] to
be interpreted in such a manner.155
Shackling such a foundation to an argument in support of
disenrollment would be nothing short of argumentative contortion.
While it is true that the federal judiciary should not intervene in
tribal governance or legislation, the argument that disenrollment
imperils the identity of tribes and that it only exists because that
identity has been externally manipulated and obfuscated is both
undeniable and axiomatic. Every aspect of a tribe’s identity exists
and has existed in some way through its membership and, therefore,
to extinguish tribal membership, or the connections that serve as its
foundation, is to extinguish tribal identity. Because there is no
indication that disenrollment is in any way linked to Native
culture,156 it is entirely unclear what aspect of Native identity would
be preserved by its continued and unrestrained practice.
The pro-disenrollment argument is also severely hampered
by the fact that the Santa Claran constitution differs significantly
from those mirroring Cohen’s model. The Martinez opinion also
rests on the Court’s recognition that Indian tribes “retain[] their
original natural rights,”157 including their power to “regulat[e] their
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internal and social relations.”158 When Cohen wrote his model
constitution, he indicated that for each tribe these powers rested in a
“General Tribal Council . . . composed of all the qualified voters of
the [tribe].”159 Cohen’s model is also that of an enumerated powers
constitution, in that it indicates that those powers not explicitly
vested in the officers of a tribe remain in the hands of the people.160
Unlike many of the tribal constitutions adopted in the 1930s—which
happen to closely follow Cohen’s model161—the 1935 Santa Claran
constitution does not explicitly indicate that the governing body of
the tribe is a General Tribal Counsel. Instead, the Pueblo adopted
provisions indicating that the entirety of its governing power shall
be vested in a pueblo counsel composed of the organization’s
officers.162 And, while the Santa Claran constitution features a
section concerning its future amendment and a “general pueblo”
approval requirement, that section deviates from Cohen’s model and
is arguably legally ambiguous and, therefore, open to the
interpretation of the pueblo counsel.163 Furthermore, the provision
challenged in Martinez is in direct conflict with the provision it
replaced, which states that “[t]he membership of the [Pueblo] shall
consist [in part of] . . . [a]ll children of mixed marriages between
members of the Santa Clara pueblo and nonmembers, provided such
children have been recognized and adopted by the council.”164 On
account of these deviations from constitutional norms, it may be
inappropriate to apply the ruling in Martinez to disenrollment
challenges concerning any tribe whose membership retains a greater
degree of authority, particularly when those tribes have not adopted
constitutional provisions that justify the disenrollment of a
petitioner. Because restricting or prohibiting federal judicial review
of tribal legislation and its enforcement may be necessary to prevent
a degree of interference that would diminish tribal sovereignty, it is
still important that this brand of review is left to tribal courts.
However, those courts need to operate independently of the other
branches of tribal government in order to ensure that the rights of
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tribal members are preserved,165 and—more importantly—the legal
community cannot operate under the assumption that the judicial
restrictions in Martinez apply to tribal courts.
2.  

United Nations Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples

UNDRIP is a document that was drafted and adopted by the
United Nations in 2007 to officially recognize the rights of
indigenous peoples across the globe.166 Although the United States
initially voted against the adoption of UNDRIP, President Obama
formally adopted the Declaration in 2010.167 While the adoption is
not legally binding on the federal government,168 many tribal
advocates believe that UNDRIP has been and will continue to be a
positive force in federal Indian law and policy reform.169 Because
the policy considerations recognized in UNDRIP ought to be
preserved and respected, it is important to understand how
proponents and opponents of disenrollment may utilize the
Declaration as a basis for their respective arguments.
While many of the articles contained in UNDRIP have some
bearing on the problem of unjust disenrollment, the only article that
directly relates to issues pertaining to membership is UNDRIP
Article 33, which states the following: (1) “Indigenous peoples have
the right to determine their own identity or membership in
accordance with their customs and traditions,” and (2) “[i]ndigenous
peoples have the right to determine the structures and select the
membership of their institutions in accordance with their own
procedures.”170 At first blush, this language seems to wholly support
the notion that a tribe may determine its membership as it sees fit,
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which would clearly appeal to a proponent of disenrollment.
However, a deeper analysis of the Article indicates that its drafters
were not advocating for a process by which a tribal government
could arbitrarily revoke the tribal identities of indigenous persons.
If we as tribal advocates wish UNDRIP to be legally binding,
we ought to interpret it in light of the canons of statutory
interpretation. In particular, “effect must be given to all the words
of the [Article] . . . so that none will be void, superfluous, or
redundant.”171 Applying this rule, we are necessarily led to the
conclusion that the determination of the identity or membership of
indigenous peoples referred to in (1) must be distinguished from the
selection of members of indigenous peoples’ institutions referred to
in (2). The plain language of these sections indicates that the former
concerns tribal membership whereas the latter concerns the election
and/or appointment of tribal officials. In either case, Article 33
concerns actions to be taken by indigenous peoples rather than a
discrete and centralized tribal government, and in the case of
determining tribal membership, those actions must be taken in
accordance with custom and tradition.
Given the above interpretation of Article 33, the issues
become whether there are tribal traditions or customs that justify
disenrollment. David E. Wilkins, who has extensively studied the
history and litigation surrounding disenrollment, indicates that
while American Indians did practice banishment or exile, the word
“disenrollment” is a legal term that did not appear until the 1930s.172
Further, Wilkins writes that accounts of and ordinances concerning
early exclusion practices indicate that banishment was only used to
address what tribes traditionally considered serious crimes—e.g.
murder, failure to contribute ones labor to the community, and
incest— unless the person facing banishment was an adopted
member of an alien nation.173 Gabe Galanda, a staunch legal
advocate for those facing disenrollment, further explains that tribal
membership was traditionally based on “kinship and belonging at
birth” and that membership criteria that deviate from the rule of
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kinship were forced upon tribes organizing under the Indian
Reorganization Act in the 1930s.174 In Galanda’s own words:
Under the IRA, family members became political
members of tribal constitutional governments and
corporate entities, particularly under boilerplate
constitutions and corporate charters foisted upon
tribes by John Collier and his followers, including a
nascent National Congress of American Indians.
Under those new tribal laws, tribal relatives can be
“disenrolled” from the tribe.175 	
 
	
 
The words of Wilkins and Galanda indicate that UNDRIP does not
provide any justification for depriving indigenous persons of the
benefits of their tribal identities as the justifications for and the act
of disenrollment have no basis in the customs or traditions of Native
peoples.
Arguably, UNDRIP presents a floor and not a ceiling for
how we ought to interpret the rights of tribal organizations, and
Martinez raises this floor by affirming the right of tribes to
determine their identities and membership requirements without the
need for traditional or customary justification. This is incredibly
important because tribal identities have been manipulated and tribal
traditions and customs have been obscured by acts of Congress and
the federal agencies formed to assist in tribal governmental
development. However, it is even more important to recognize that
these manipulations of the federal government have shaped external
perspectives of tribal identity to the point that “the tribe” and “tribal
rights” are seen as being ontologically divorced from tribal
membership, but this is entirely antithetical to most, if not all,
conceptions of tribal sovereignty. For a great many tribes—
including some of those that have engaged in the disenrollment of
genuine tribal members—the tribe is one and the same with its
membership.176 As such, the rights of a tribe belong to and are to be
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exercised by its members. In light of tribal governmental changes
during the 1930s, directly exercising the right to define tribal
membership would require the membership to draft and adopt its
own relevant constitutional provisions, whereas indirect exercise of
this right would at least require that such provisions or disenrollment
actions be ratified by a majority vote of all qualified members.177
Either way, constitutional articles formally recognizing the voting
rights of tribal members must be ironclad and protections
concerning these rights must be robust in order to ensure that the
rights of a tribe are honored and respected.
The importance of the tribal franchise may be clearly
illustrated by the factual backdrops of several recent disenrollment
cases. In particular, these cases demonstrate how several forms of
disenfranchisement have allowed officials and/or tribal minority
factions to invalidate aspects of their tribal identities to profit both
politically and economically. The factual backdrop of these cases is
of supreme importance because the best way to prevent unjust
disenrollment is to prevent such an action from ever being initiated.
In a great many cases, a more complete understanding and
appreciation of the scope of tribal authority and constitutional
protections on the parts of tribal members, tribal officials, and the
greater legal community may forestall the tragedy that is associated
with disenrollment.
B.  

Elem Indian Colony and the Disenfranchisement of
Potential Disenrollees

On March 30, 2016, the sixty-one adult members of Elem
Indian Colony of Pomo Indians were served with orders of
disenrollment informing them that all of the members living on the
Clear Lake reservation, including seventy-one children, were being
simultaneously disenrolled from the tribe and banished from its
id. art. I (recognizing all adult members of the Crow Tribe of Indians as the
governing body of the Tribe.).
177
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lands.178 For the time being, the potential disenrollees are also being
denied rights to both voting and health services.179 The Elem Tribal
Council, whose members reside in the San Francisco Bay Area,180
justified this action by way of reference to a conflict concerning its
2014 tribal election.181 Those facing disenrollment claim that each
of the adults residing on the reservation at the time, sixty of the 121
members on the then-current membership roll, were denied access
to the election venue.182 Having been denied the ability to vote at the
“official election,” the allegedly ousted members decided to hold an
election of their own; according to the tribal council, this was a
treasonous attempt at a coup and warranted disenrollment.183
Aside from the grounds presented for the removal of the
reservation residents, there is ample reason to believe that this, like
many other mass disenrollment actions was prompted by a struggle
for economic control. In the months prior to the disputed election,
the Elem Tribal Council submitted a proposal concerning the right
to establish a casino on North Mare Island to the City of Vallejo, a
document in which their traditional homeland is described as
polluted to the point that it is “worse than useless.”184 This push for
capital gains is a reflection of the council’s departure from tradition
and a self-proclaimed philosophy in which “the present is sacred and
the past is just a memory.”185
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For Robert Geary, who has devoted himself to the
preservation of the culture and traditions of the greater Pomo
community, and the others who reside there, the reservation is more
than just a home—it is a sacred site; it is a place of ceremony, and it
provides them with the cultural resources they need in order to
thrive.186 For those living on the Clear Lake reservation, the land of
their ancestors is far too valuable for them to part with it for the sake
of building a casino, particularly when there is little reason to
believe that any derivative profits would be utilized for the sake of
those who currently live on the reservation.187
Although the Elem Indian Colony receives $1,200,000.00
per year in Revenue Sharing Trust Funds,188 which are distributed
to non-gaming tribes to fund social services,189 this money is “used
almost entirely to fund Elem’s government operations.”190 In
reference to the Vallejo proposal, these operations include funding
the tribal council’s efforts to obtain an exclusive right to negotiate
with the city and, potentially, guaranteeing loans and paying for
consultant services.191 In the meantime, the reservation residents are
being denied essential services by the tribal council who refuses to
fund them; they are not even provided with access to waste removal
services.192 Moreover, when nonmembers contributed funds to help
the reservation recover from the fire that destroyed several homes in
Clearlake last year, the funds were withheld from those people
actually living on the reservation.193 What is revealed in these facts
is a trend—not exclusive to this tribal organization194—toward
separating the tribal government, along with its control over the
tribal economy, from a group that made up roughly one half of the
tribe’s membership.
Ironically, the ordinance that could potentially lead to
disenrollment in this case was drafted by a non-Indian lawyer who
is vehemently opposed to the idea of disenrollment as punishment.
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Anthony Cohen, former attorney for Elem Indian Colony, refused to
draft a disenrollment ordinance for the Elem Indian Colony Tribal
Council and, instead, convinced the tribe to adopt an ordinance that
would only include disenfranchisement, banishment, and revenue
forfeiture while preserving a defendant’s due process rights under
the ICRA.195 However, when Cohen was informed that the tribe
planned to engage in mass disenrollment, he capitulated to the tribal
council’s demands to amend the previously drafted ordinance to
allow the action to move forward.196 But, in Cohen’s mind, he had
preserved the rights of those facing disenrollment by including
reference to ICRA in the ordinance.197 The due process provision of
that ordinance reads as follows:
Due Process. All persons accused of offenses that
could subject them to sanctions under this Ordinance
shall be afforded due process and fundamental
fairness pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act of
1968 (“ICRA”) and this ordinance shall be
interpreted in a manner that is consistent with the
ICRA.198
According to Cohen, the above language would provide
those facing disenrollment with a route by which to circumvent
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez; he explains that when tribal
officials violate ICRA, they act outside of their tribal authority and,
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therefore, may be sued in state court so long as PL- 280 applies.199
Cohen describes a suit of this nature as requesting the court to rule
that such an official is acting/speaking only in his or her individual
capacity and to enjoin that individual from speaking for his or her
tribe while holding them liable for defamation.200 Cohen provides
no support for his claim other than the following quote from
Borisclair v. Superior Court: “In general, the agent of a sovereign
may be held liable when he acts in excess of his authority or under
an authority not validly conferred.”201 While the grist of Cohen’s
argument is agreeable, it falls prey to several flaws in application:
(1) Martinez, at least by extension, bars extratribal judiciaries from
interpreting ICRA on the behalf of tribes;202 (2) actions taken by a
tribal council are not likely to be attributed to an official in his or
her individual capacity;203 and (3) there appears to be no precedent
for an action of this sort. However, Cohen’s aim to shield tribal
members from unjust disenrollment is an admirable one that is
shared by ethically-minded tribal attorneys serving throughout
Indian country, and, sadly, the perpetual frustration of this aim is not
uncommon.
Although the protections that Cohen sought to have formally
recognized would likely be inadequate, his efforts indicate that he
believes that the actions of tribal officials must be rooted in the
collective will of the membership of their tribes. To suggest that
tribal officials are acting outside the scope of their authority—when
an ordinance could be interpreted as validating their actions—is to
suggest that the legally valid actions of such officials must also be
199
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validated by the will of tribal members in order for them to be
effective manifestations of tribal authority. However, recognition of
this limitation on the authority of tribal officials cannot be left
entirely to the courts, particularly when this recognition depends
upon a nuanced interpretation of ICRA.
C.  

The Indian Civil Rights Act as a Potential Defense
Against Disenrollment

ICRA is probably the most cited grounds for defending
against an action to disenroll or banish tribal members. Disenrollees
tend to rely upon the section of that Act codified as 25 U.S.C. §
1302(a)(8),204 which reads as follows: “No Indian tribe exercising
the powers of self-government shall deny to any person the equal
protection of its laws or deprive any person of liberty or property
without due process.”205 However, federal courts elaborating on the
holding in Martinez have explained that ICRA “[can]not be
interpreted to impliedly create a federal cause of action against an
Indian tribe or its officers for deprivation of the Act’s substantive
rights.”206 In particular, the Court in Martinez—which concerned
the topic of membership but did not touch that of disenrollment—
explained that 25 U.S.C. § 1302 does not, on its face, “purport[] to
subject tribes to the jurisdiction of federal courts.”207 Moreover,
courts have held that, in spite of the language of 25 U.S.C. § 1302,
the holding in Martinez “foreclosed any reading of [ICRA] as
authority for bringing civil actions in federal court to request . . .
forms of relief [other than habeas corpus].”208
In spite of prior rulings concerning actions based on 25
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8), there is one case in which a federal court
allowed that section of the Act to direct its ruling: Sweet v.
Hintzman.209 In that case, Petitioners argued that the Respondents—
collectively the Snoqualmie Tribal Council—violated rights
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guaranteed to the Petitioners under 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8).210 In
particular, the Petitioners alleged that the Respondents violated their
rights to due process in the following ways:
(a) by not providing adequate formal notice of the
April 27, 2008 banishment meeting to Petitioners;
(b) by making false charges against Petitioners; (c)
by not providing an opportunity for the Petitioners to
be heard at the April 27, 2008 banishment meeting;
and (d) by not following their own procedures for
voting on banishment.211
Based on these allegations, the court found that the Petitioners had
been denied procedural due process and granted the Petitioners a
writ of habeas corpus.212 From this, we can reason that, while 25
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(8) does not provide any positive form of relief, it
may be used to justify granting a writ of habeas corpus.
The other section of ICRA implicated in Sweet and other
similar cases is 25 U.S.C. § 1303, which provides that “[t]he
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any
person, in a court of the United States, to test the legality of his
detention by order of an Indian tribe.”213 Unlike 25 U.S.C. §
1302(a)(8), this section of ICRA explicitly provides a form of relief
that may be granted to potential disenrollees by an extra-tribal
judiciary. The case Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians
provides some indication as to the grounds for granting this form of
relief in the disenrollment context.
In Poodry, the Petitioners allegedly formed a rogue faction
after accusing Respondent members of the Tonawanda Council of
Chiefs of “misusing tribal funds, suspending tribal elections,
excluding members of the Council of Chiefs from the tribe's
business affairs, and burning tribal records.”214 In response, the
council declared the Petitioners guilty of treason and sent between
fifteen and twenty individuals to eject them from the reservation
210
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and, in doing so, effect orders of disenrollment and banishment
brought against them.215 While the attempt was unsuccessful, those
allied with the council engaged the Petitioners in a campaign of
assault and harassment.216 This prompted the Petitioners to file for
writs of habeas corpus under 25 U.S.C. § 1303.217
In reviewing the case, the court in Poodry establish the
elements required in order for a court to grant the relief requested.
First, the court held that such a request would only be valid if the
underlying sanction was criminal, rather than civil, in nature.218
Second, a petitioner must demonstrate that the challenged sanction
constituted a “sufficiently severe potential or actual restraint on
liberty”;219 however, “actual physical custody is not a jurisdictional
prerequisite for federal habeas review.”220 Rather, those facing
banishment or disenrollment may successful petition for habeas
relief insofar as they may, at any point in time, be compelled to leave
the reservation and barred from ever returning; such a restraint is not
generally imposed upon the members of a tribe and may, therefore,
be considered an undue restraint on the liberty of tribal members.221
While both Sweet and Poodry suggest that ICRA may
provide a route by which potential disenrollees can preserve their
membership in a tribe, it is important to note that any such
protections offered by ICRA are not absolute. There are many cases
that directly oppose the rulings mentioned above.222 Some courts
have asserted that disenrollment cannot be equated to the detainment
required for a grant of habeas relief under 25 U.S.C. § 1303,223
whereas others have ruled that—even when Poodry does apply—
disenrollment coupled with only a partial exclusion from tribal
resources and facilities does not constitute a “sufficiently severe
restraint on liberty to constitute detention and invoke federal habeas
jurisdiction under ICRA.”224
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In spite of the aforementioned legal barriers, it is
unquestionably appropriate to invoke ICRA as the legal
representative of potential disenrollees. On its face, ICRA was
clearly meant to prevent the diminishment of the rights of tribal
members, and disenrollment actions jeopardize those rights in toto.
Arguably, all tribal advocates—attorneys representing tribes and
their members—ought to challenge interpretations of ICRA that
render the protections recognized in that Act ineffective.
Although ICRA-based litigation strategies may vary in
effectiveness depending on jurisdiction, this caselaw, Sweet in
particular, may inform the drafting of constitutional or tribal code
amendments to address the problem of unjust disenrollment. A
lesson we can learn from Sweet is that a tribe’s failure to provide
defendants with adequate due process negatively affects both sides
of any litigation involving a tribal party. What this means for tribes,
is that specific due process protections, at the very least, ought to be
codified. In particular, tribes should formally recognize the rights to
notice and hearing, counsel, and appeal and, in doing so, define the
scope of those rights. The benefits of such codifications for tribal
defendants is obvious, but tribes benefit from this process in two
ways: (1) Courts will be less likely to overrule tribal sentencing on
due process grounds, and (2) robust due process protections create
tribal remedies that must be exhausted before tribal actions may be
challenged in federal court. Rather than merely inserting ICRA into
a tribal constitution (which would have minimal effect because the
statute already creates a legal duty), tribes should attempt to provide
their own express interpretations of 25 U.S.C. § 1302 in their
constitutions or tribal codes to the extent that they would like to
preserve the rights therein for their members and partially immunize
themselves from extra-jurisdictional challenges. However, reliance
upon ICRA is reactionary and, therefore, is unlikely to prevent the
initiation of disenrollment actions. Further, in order for
constitutional amendments advanced by the general membership of
a tribe to be adopted, members must be able to call special meetings
to encourage their adoption and the tribal franchise must be both
protected and honored.225
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D.   The Nooksack Tribe and Holdover Councils
Another egregious example of disenfranchisement lies in the
disenrollment proceedings at Nooksack. Those proceedings concern
the mass disenrollment of 331 tribal members, 306 of whom are
descended from Annie George, the biological daughter of Nooksack
Chief Matsqui George.226 These descendants of Annie George,
known collectively as the Nooksack 306, were actively recruited by
tribal leadership to return to their traditional homeland to help justify
the tribe’s application for federal recognition.227 Although this
recruitment was presumably prompted in-part by the acknowledged
tribal ancestry of the Nooksack 306, the tribal council continues to
seek to disenroll them because Annie George was not included on a
1942 federal census.228 Over time, these disenrollments have been
challenged on several grounds.229
To preserve and enforce these disenrollment orders, the
Nooksack Tribal Council— which was headed by an adoptee with
no biological connection to the tribe230—has perpetually denied the
voting rights of its members. When the terms of the disenrolling
councilpersons had expired, they refused to vacate office.231
Because those terms had expired, the council was unable to form a
quorum necessary for the conducting of tribal business.232 To
remedy the issue, the council amended tribal law to allow for a mailin voting process and then filed a motion to deprive the potential
disenrollees of their rights to vote.233 When Nooksack Tribal Court
(NTC) Chief Judge Susan Alexander suggested that she would deny
the motion, the council cancelled their planned election.234 The
council then announced that it would postpone the election until

226

GABE GALANDA, OMNIBUS WRITTEN RESPONSE OF NOOKSACK TRIBAL
MEMBERS PROPOSED FOR DISENROLLMENT 5 (2016),
https://turtletalk.files.wordpress.com/2016/10/omnibus-written-response-ofnooksack- tribal-members-proposed-for-disenrollment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q9HG-YGPY].
227
DAVID E. WILKINS & SHELLY HULSE WILKINS, DISMEMBERED: NATIVE
DISENROLLMENT AND THE BATTLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 86 (2017).
228
Order Determining Heirs, In re Louis (Louie) George, No. IP-PO-61K-71.
229
See generally GALANDA, supra note 226.
230
Id. at 8–9.
231
Demand for Jury Retrial, Rabang v. Kelly, No. 2:17-CV-00088-JCC 7 (May
3, 2017).
232
Id.
233
Id. at 8–9.
234
Id. at 9.

45

after disenrollment.235 After Chief Judge Alexander suggested that
she would compel the election, the tribal council amended the
Nooksack Tribal Code to bar plaintiffs’ counsel from practicing in
NTC and eventually fired Alexander only to replace her with their
in-house counsel Raymond Dodge.236
The procedural backdrop for the Nooksack disenrollment
cases clearly shows that when the tribal franchise is selectively
limited or entirely eliminated, there are no safeguards against the
overreach of tribal councils. It also shows that the disenrollment
epidemic is deeply rooted in the denial of the popular sovereignty
that lies at the heart of traditional tribal self-governance and is the
undisputed source of tribal sovereignty. For this reason, both
proponents of a brand of tribal sovereignty that entails complete
control over determinations concerning membership and opponents
of unjust disenrollment ought to encourage constitutional
amendments that preserve the traditional source of sovereignty
under UNDRIP and due process rights under ICRA by reinforcing
the tribal franchise.
E.  

The Pechanga Band: The Invalidation of Expert Opinions
and Moratoriums on Disenrollment

One last case that illustrates the importance of preserving the
tribal franchise through preemptive measures is Jeffredo v.
Macarro. According to the Appellants in Jeffredo, roughly twentyfive percent of the Pechanga Tribe’s general membership had been
disenrolled between the years of 2002—when the Tribe opened its
San Diego casino237—and 2007.238 In the last wave of
disenrollments, the validity of which is the subject of the litigation,
approximately 200 adults and 200 children were disenrolled.239 This
action was not the result of careful investigation into the Appellants’
claims to membership, nor was it an expression of the will of the
Tribe’s general council; instead this action was initiated by a simple
vote of an “Enrollment Committee.”240
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Two factors set the Pechangan disenrollment dispute apart
from those mentioned above. Firstly, the Pechanga Tribal Council—
through the actions of its enrollment committee—acted directly
against the proclaimed will of the general membership. Secondly,
the tribal council disregarded anthropological evidence verifying the
Appellants’ claims to membership. While the tribal council was
deciding to pursue disenrollment, the Pechanga General
Membership, from whom the powers of Pechangan governance
originate, voted to institute a moratorium on disenrollment
actions.241 Although the petition underlying the moratorium was
written in support of the Appellants and purposed with putting an
end to all current and future disenrollments, the tribal council and
its Enrollment Committee ruled by executive fiat that the
moratorium would not apply to the Appellants.242
In order to justify its actions, the tribal council hired Dr. John
R. Johnson of the Santa Barbara Natural History Museum to
determine whether the Appellants’ common ancestor, Paulina
Hunter, was a genuine member of the Tribe.243 According to Dr.
Johnson, his findings were largely disregarded by the tribal
council.244 His interpretation of the data he collected is that
“[t]he preponderance of the evidence indicates that Paulina Hunter’s
father was Mateo Quasacac, who was the only Indian listed as
having been born at ‘Pichanga’ in the surviving early records of
Mission San Luis Rey.”245 Instead of concluding that this was
evidence of the fact that Paulina Hunter and her descendants are
Pechangan, the tribal council ruled that “the correct tribal ancestry
of Paulina Hunter was San Luis Rey” rather than Pechanga
Temecula.246 This ruling completely disregards the fact that the
genealogies of virtually all members of the Tribe can be, according
to mission records, traced back to San Luis Rey; it also contradicts
evidence indicating that Restituta, Paulina Hunter’s maternal
grandmother, was born at the original village of Temecula.247
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Feeling that the facts clearly demonstrated that they had been
unjustly disenrolled, the Appellants in Jeffredo maintained an
argument that they were entitled to habeas relief under ICRA
because their collective disenrollment amounted to an unlawful
detention.248 The court rejected this argument as being a basis for
federal court jurisdiction for two reasons. First, the court held that
the Appellants’ disenrollment was not tantamount to detention
because they were not restrained from accessing the Pechanga
Reservation and could continue to access the property they held
therein.249 Second, the court held that because the Appellants had
not been so excluded, they had not exhausted tribal remedies to such
an action as would be required for a federal court to assume
jurisdiction over the matter.250 The court indicated no concern with
the fact that the tribe could do nothing to regain their membership
rights other than bring a claim in federal court.
Because both the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals and the
Appellants acknowledged that federal courts lack jurisdiction to
review tribal membership decisions,251 it is important to recognize
that it is possible for tribal officials to constrain facts and the
legislative authority of their general membership to serve personal
ends that are wholly divorced from the will of the tribe. When
genuine members of any tribe face disenrollment and the unified
will of their tribal community, as expressed through the tribal
franchise and recognized in a tribal constitution, cannot preserve
their personal, cultural, and biological identities, they have no
choice but to turn to litigation. Here, the Appellants exhausted the
remedies provided by the tribe and were left with no other option
than to bring their challenge to federal court. Ideally, such recourse
would be amenable to the best argument. However, the only
argument to which the federal judiciary is—and arguably ought to
be—receptive is an ICRA-based challenge alleging that petitioners
have been detained. As Jeffredo and other cases illustrate, such
challenges have a tendency to prove futile in the disenrollment
context. Assuming that the status quo is maintained, this case
illustrates the fact that the only effective prophylactic for preventing
unjust disenrollment and the potential spread of this epidemic is
ensuring that the popular vote of tribal members carries that level of
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authority that has been recognized in countless tribal constitutions,
which is the authority from which every other power of governance
arises: the will of the people. Even if the authority of those facing
disenrollment is diminished, the remainder of the general
membership must have some way to challenge those actions of a
tribal council that it finds unjust.
IV.   CONCLUSION
The point of this article is not to challenge the authority of a
tribal council or its members, rather we must recognize that tribal
sovereignty originates in the people of the tribes. Some tribal
officials and tribal advocates have a severely confused interpretation
of this notion, a notion that the constitutions which they are tasked
with upholding explicitly recognize. The source of this confusion
lies in an Anglo-American conception of government where, aside
from exercising the power to vote, citizens and their governments
tend to function independently. Certainly, off-reservation political
existence entails an ebb and flow between the people-at-large and
the State, but a tribe and its people are and have always been one.
For this reason, it is paradoxical to suggest that a tribe could
represent its interests over those of its members. But this is sadly
how some in our community justify the practice of disenrollment.
How did we get to this point where, to mirror a popular
epithet, we can’t see the tribe for its members? Arguably, this
destructive trend began with colonization, but it really took hold
when, during the Era of Assimilation, the federal government took
several steps to distinguish “civilized” Indians from “savages” who
adhered to practices of personal and cultural significance. Part of
this campaign entailed the prohibition of sacred activities that served
in-part as the foundations of Native societies, prohibitions that
would be enforced in Indian courts presided over by Indian judges.
After diminishing the religious freedoms of those Indians that
resided within its ambit, the federal government sought to deprive
Indians of the freedoms of choosing how to live and how to expend
their labor. This was the state of things in Indian country when the
IRA was enacted.
While the IRA was purposed with recognizing the right of
the tribes to govern themselves, this legislation came at a time when
the foundations of Native society had been so thoroughly legislated
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that it may have been easy to lose sight of them or their importance.
It is no wonder that many tribes adopting constitutions under this
Act, having been to some extent deprived of the traditional
foundations of their societies for generations, modeled their
governmental structures after the representative form of government
that could be found outside of Indian country and that was thrust
upon them by the Department of the Interior. While many of the
constitutions adopted under the IRA recognized that sovereignty
originated in the general membership of the tribes, they also
recognized that this sovereignty would be almost entirely vested in
tribal councils; still, the foundation of governmental authority was
recognized as remaining in the people.
Sadly, without recognition of this authority, which—as is the
case in Anglo-American society—can for many tribal members only
be recognized and exercised through the franchise, every other
derivative right of the general membership of a tribe can be either
diminished or extinguished. However, when the actions of tribal
councils are amenable to the will of the people, as expressed through
the popular vote, these rights can be preserved in perpetuity. Not
only does recognition of this fact protect the genuine members of
tribes from unjust disenrollment, it also protects the root and
expression of sovereignty as it is recognized in both AngloAmerican and Native societies. To dispute this is not to recognize
the inherent sovereignty of a tribe, it is to diminish it. For this reason,
it is important that tribes formally establish constitutional
protections for tribal voting rights and approval requirements for the
types of membership decisions that could potentially jeopardize
tribal sovereignty.
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